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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

rHE STATE Of UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent

'iCHARD HATfIELD NICKLES AND
MARGARET K. NICKLES,

Case No. 19221
Category No. 2

Defendants/Appellants
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by the
court on October 7, 1986.

Originally this case was an appeal from

convictions and judgments imposed for Aggravated Arson, a felony in
the Second Degree, and Insurance Fraud, a felony of the Second
Degree, in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, Presiding.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant at 2-16.

INTRODUCTION
In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886),
the Utah Supreme court stated the standard for the granting of a
petition for rehearing:
:,e made>.

"To justify a rehearing, a strong case must

We must be convinced that the court failed to consider

nme naterial point in the case, or that it erred in its
,_·unclusion.s,

In Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P.619 at 624

l'Jtah 1913), the Court declared:

To make an application for a rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to
discourage the practice of filing petitions for
rehearings in proper cases. When this court,
however, has considered and decided all of the
material questions involved in a case, a
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or
decision which may affect the result, or that we
have based the decision on some wrong principle
of law, or have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the result .
If there are some reasons, however, such as
we have indicated above, or other good reasons, a
petition for a rehearing should be promptly f 1led
and, if it is meritorious, its form will in no
case be scrutinized by this court.
The argument section of this brief will establish that,

appl~ 1 ~

these standards, the Appellant's petition for rehearing is prow
before the Court and should be granted.

Indeed, in its opin1oc,

State v. Nickles, 43 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, (filed Oct. 7, 19861,
(Addendum A).

This court has misapprehended and overlooked isoc·

of fact and law.
ARGUMENT
THE DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST
IN PROSECUTING APPELLANTS' CASE WARRANTS A NEW TR Be
In the opinion in this case his court held that if a
defendant fails to move for disqualification of a prosecutor

d.

trial level, the defendant must subsequently demonstrate that
actually prejudiced by the prosecutor's conflict of interest:;
justify an order for a new trial on this "actual preJud1ce' sun
is applied even if the defendant did not know, and had no :,,;sc·
know, of the prosecutor's conflict at the time of trial.

suci

standard is impossible to meet and constitutes a dangerou 0
diminution of a prosecutor's ethical and legal

-2 -

obligation~.

While it may be sound legal policy to require the actual
preJudice standard on appeal in a case where the defendant knew or
3,1

reason to know of the prosecutor's conflict at the time of trial

:,, .. u.s. v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.c. Cir. 1981)], the standard is
00und policy in a case in which the defendant could not be
2 xpe··teJ

to know of the conflict at the time of trial.
Presumably, according to the opinion in this case, if a
had moved for disqualification at the time of trial, this

Jef~ndant

court would apply an appearance of conflict standard on appeal.
However, the Court's opinion expressed concern about a defendant who
tries to take advantage of the system, to "become the unintended
,beneficiary] of a rule that attempts to promote the public good."
'.iickles at 25.

Yet, this concern would only arise in a case in

the defendant knew, or had reason to know, of a prosecutorial

~nich

conf:ict of interest at the time of trial, but failed to timely
raise the issue, thus inviting error.

The Court may fairly infer

that a defendant who knows or should know of a conflict at the time
of

trial, but did not raise the issue, did not himself consider the

P·Jtential for actual prejudice to be very great and has thus waived
the issue.

This is the situation described in U.S. v. Heldt, supra,

' case cited by the court in support of the actual prejudice
oldndard delivered in the opinion in this case.

See especially,

at 1277, footnote 81.

.~

In Heldt, the defendant Church of Scientology claimed on
·' l'l:eJ'

t ·) t

'he f

H

st time

that it was denied due process of law by

'L•"''1ed prosecutorial conflict of interest.
.i•

JT •

11

'Jf

~at 1275.

Scientology had filed a civil suit against the U.s.

-3 -

The

Attorney's Office prior to its criminal trial.

Heldt at 1275

church claimed that because two prosecutors were defendants in
civil trial, they were self-interested in its outcome and thus
not fairly prosecute the criminal charge.

Id.

The court nntc

even though the church knew of the alleged conflict at the
trial,

ti~.

it failed to raise the issue, along with other asserte, 1

grounds, in its Motion to Disqualify, made at the time of t,, 0
Heldt at 1277.

The Court found the alleged conflict to be verc

weak, basing this finding in large part on the fact that even·
the defendants knew of the conflict at the time of trial, '[the
conflict J was not at all a pp a rent, as evidenced by the fact tna:
appellants never relied on it as a basis for disqualification.'

1.£.

Under these circumstances the Court held that when defencio:.

have failed to move to disqualify on the ground of a conflict
interest, yet assert a denial of due process on appeal, actua:
prejudice must be shown to justify a new trial.

Id.

The hold:·

.!i_eldt is limited to the situation where a defendant knew of

t~e

conflict at the time of trial, yet failed to raise it in his·'·,·
to Disqualify.

This is simply not the situation in the case"'·

before the court.

Neither the Nickles nor their attorney knew

Christiansen's corporate involvement, or of his private busines:
dealings with the insurance adjusting company that investigate:
case or of the prosecutor's personal financial interest in pleathat adjusting company, which investigated the Nickles f11e, _..
November of 1982, some five months after the trial.
short, neither the Nickles nor their attorney knew of

(R. 2431
~he

r

degree of risk of actual prejudice that existed at the time

-4 -

until well after the Nickles were convicted.

·rt~l

The court,

l:cc·.ieve r, seems to have overlooked this crucial distinguishing
;iracteristic between the instant case

, 11

and~·

This is

, ,,Jenced by the Court's statement that the "defendants failed to
.,,,,;p

1n

the trial court to disqualify the prosecutor and only now,

"Jppeal, assert a denial of due process and equal protection."
Nickles at 25.

This comment by the Court, and its reliance upon

Heldt appears to indicate that the Court believed that the Nickles
knew at the time of trial of the conflict, yet failed to raise the
,asue.

As demonstrated, the record clearly shows that this is a

~1sapprehension

of fact.

In the opinion in this case, the Court also cited Wright v.
Jnited States, 732 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1984) as support for the
adoption of the actual prejudice standard.

The opinion quoted the

following from Wright:

[T]he degree of prosecutorial misconduct ...
and the degree of prejudice to the defendant
necessary to justify action by a reviewing court
steadily increase as the case goes forward, with
the least being required on a motion to disqualify,
somewhat more on a pre-trial motion to dismiss an
indictment, still more on a motion in the district
court after conviction but before appeal, [and]
somewhat more on a direct appeal.
~l

Jtah Adv. Rep. at 25 citing 732 F.2d at 1056 n.8.

~0wever,

'111d]

a good deal more on collateral attack"

~"''t1,ute

-1~urts
•.13

the uncited remainder of the quote goes on to say ".

8.

Wright at 1056,

Appellants argue that taken as a whole, this quotation

the notion

that cases should be reviewed on an individual

tu ascertain the potential for actual prejudice based upon the

-5 -

strength of the apparent conflict.

Certainly, cases arise Whic•

contain slight evidence of a conflict sufficient to disqualify

6

prosecutor at the trial level but insufficient to cause an appe
court to remand for a new trial.

However, the issue in this c"c-

addressed by Wright, concerns the potential for actual

prejudi:~

created by a prosecutor acting due to improper motivation to
investigate, initiate, and try a case.

Contrary to the assertLc

the opinion in this case, Wright does not require a showing that
defendant was in fact prejudiced by the prosecutor's conflict.
Wright only notes that it is the better policy to require that
risk the defendant was actually prejudiced be greater to just1f:.·
order of a new trial on appeal, than is necessary to disqualify
prosecutor at trial.

Wright at 1056.

The degree of risk, the

danger that the prosecutor acted due to improper motivation, in
effect, the potential for actual prejudice,
considered by the court on appeal.

is what should be

This can be effectively

determined by a facial evaluation of the nature of the conflict
itself.
A requirement that the defendant show actual prejudice
appeal is, for practical purposes, an impossible standard to me;·
The degree of risk that the prosecutor acted due to improper
motivation, the possibility of actual prejudice, is all that ca·
shown by a defendant.

Indeed, in most cases, the sole source

information concerning a prosecutorial conflict is the
himself.

0;

prosec~t

A defendant and his attorney are at the mercy of the

prosecutor concerning what is disclosed about such a conf l1ct.
prosecutor may disclose as much or as little as he chooses reg':

-6 -

the conflict.

However, to believe that

in most instances

a

prosecutor would admit to an improper motivation, risking both the
prosecution and possibly his career, is surely the paradigm of
naivete .

Yet, in effect, this Court holds that absent such

disclosure, a defendant has no remedy available on appeal, no matter
how improper a prosecutor's conduct "appears.•

The court thus

shifts the entire risk of undisclosed actual prejudice to the
defendant.
In reversing the defendant's conviction because of the
failure of the prosecutor to recuse himself due to an apparent
conflict of interest, the New York Court of Appeals articulated the
sound reasoning for adopting a "reasonable potential for prejudice•
standard for appellate review of such cases:
It would be simplistic therefore to think of
the impact of a prosecutor's conflict of interest
merely in terms of explicit instances of abuse.
Even our thumbnail description of prosecutorial
power is enough to indicate that resulting
prejudice can at least as easily flow from an act
of omission as from one of commission, from
discretion withheld as from discretion
exercised. In this context, whether abuse is
express or implied may be difficult to
determine. Suffice it to say that any
presumption of impartiality tends to be
undermined when there is a clear conflict of
interest. Indeed, the judgmental nature of much
of a District Attorney's conduct will put it
beyond effective appellate revi7w. And, no .
matter how firmly and conscientiously a District
Attorney may steel himself against the intrusion
of a competing and disqualifying interest, he
never can be certain that he has succeeded in
isolating himself from the inroads on his
subconscious.
[l] Thus, the practical impossibility of
establishing that the conflict has worked to
defendant's disadvantage dictates the ado~tion of
standards under which a reasonable potential for
prejudice will suffice.
-7 -

Furthermore, the Court stated:
It was important that these responsibilities,
carried out in the name of the State and under
the color of the law, be conducted in a manner
that fostered rather than discouraged public
confidence in our government and the system of
law to which it is dedicated.
This concern, that
those occupying prosecutorial office be Jealous
of the evidences as well as the substance of
integrity, was not to be discounted.
In
particular, the District Attorney, as guardian of
this public trust, should have abstained from an
identification, in appearance as well as in fact,
with more than one side of the controversy.
People v. Zimmer, 414
(emphasis added)

N.E.

2d 705 at 707, 708 (N.Y. 1980).

(citations omitted).

This reasoning persuasively demonstrates that the adq·
of an "actual preJudice' standard for appellate review of
prosecutorial cases conflict severely diminishes safeguards fo·
ensuring that the prosecutor meet his ethical and legal obl1ga'..
and dramatically increases the danger that defendants will oe
unjustly prosecuted and convicted.

Under the standard

adopte~

thi:> court, a prosecutor who is so disposed can bring charges'
prosecute to further his own personal interest, with little

f2i·

that a subsequent conviction will be overturned absent the d1Ec
of "smoking pistol."
In the instant case, the State conceded that "Michae:
Christiansen should not have been the attorney to investigate.
charges in and prosecute the defendants' case" Brief of
p.

41.

Respon~

Obvious.y, the State could not have reached such a

conclusion unless it believed the potential for actual pre1•1.i:
be high, not only at the time of trial, but at the time r'w
investigated and charges were filed.
-8 -

However, the opinion

, 1 se

assumed that the risk of actual prejudice

was~

high because

·.11 work performed by [Christiansen] on this case from the time of

•ce Eire in October of 1980 until June of 1981, when he discontinued
~ssociation

15

with AFI, was performed in his capacity as Deputy

,cnty Attorney.•

Nickles at 26.

This conclusion assumes the very

,,,,,,cion at issue--that because prosecutor, Christiansen said there
no involvement, there was no conflict of interest, thus no

~••

3ctual preJudice.

Yet, given the inherent self-interest of the

.~osecutor

to conceal his actual motivation, the Court, like the

~.f~ndant,

can only examine the appearance of conflict.

prc~ecutor

Christiansen's assertion that no conflict existed, (R.

~483-841,

Despite

the facts amply illustrate that the prosecutor's loyalties

•ore divided.

Indeed, at the time this case was investigated and

:narges were filed, prosecutor Christiansen's AFI was an active
business, soliciting new investigations and completing old ones.
ender the Court's analysis in this case, the potential for preJudice
at these critical stages of the Nickles prosecution was very high.
While Christiansen's corporation, AFI, had apparently
:eased most business activities at the time of the Nickles' trial
R. 2486-87), the company was still a viable business entity with
~1ke

Christiansen at its helm.

( R. 2488).

The risk of actual

preJud1ce ended only when AFI was dissolved in December of 1982,
-ell after the trial

in this case. (R. 2488).

Furthermore, it is at least possible, that at the time of
'

' Christiansen retained strong personal interest in the future
At the time of the Nickles' trial, AFI was still an

-<cst1ng,

viable corporate entity. (R. 2488).

-9 -

Christiansen was

still an officer.

(R.

2488).

The possibility of future busines:

operations and Christiansen's involvement therein, was thus a
distinct possibility.

Indeed,

the fact that Christiansen did n·

dissolve the corporation until a year and a half after his

su~>

in the county Attorney's office ordered him to cease his invol
(R.2488, 2491-92), evidences his hope of future business for Af

Because the possibility of future business for AF! dt ..
existed, Christiansen's motivation for attracting and mainta111.:..
potential sources of future income for AFI still existed.
Adjustment Bureau,

Gen':

(GAB), the insurance adjusting agency that

investigated the Nickles fire, was the same company that gave.
the majority of its business.

(R.

2464-71).

Prosecutor

Christiansen's motivation for pleasing GAB is thus obvious.

Sc:

nothing could please this source of past and future income mor'
a successful prosecution on a half million dollar claim, of o -,
GAB had vowed they were "out to get.•

(R.

2523).

The conclusion regarding the potential for actual ;'r 0 ·
is inescapable given these facts.

Simply, at the time of u1a.

prosecutor could well have entertained hopes of the continuea
viability of his private company and have been motivated to p'.
past and likely future substantial source of income for "hat
company.

The Nickles contend that this "apparent• conflict is

significant enough to justify reversal even under the Wright
"sliding scale" analysis.
For the reasons discussed above,

the better reaaoneo

requires that a showing of reasonable potential for actual

~1 '

be adopted by this Court as the standard for appellate rev1••

-10-

0 :

~, 05 ecutorial

conflicts of interest.

n"rt to reconsider

Appellants therefore ask the

its standard requiring a showing of "actual

rreiurl1cP" and remard their case for new trial, free from the risk
their

·~'

case will be preJudiced by a prosecutor serving two

CONCLUSION
Because this court has overlooked critical issues of fact
in~

•t

,__r,

!~;"
:

law in this case and because the Court has delineated a standard
1

s impossible to attain, the Appellants respectfully petition

court to reconsider its decision in this case and reverse their

0 nv1~t1ons

and remand the case for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted this

<f!!:.--day of November, 1986.

~c~
CURTIS C. NESSE
Attorney for Petitioner
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IN THE SVPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
The STATE ol Lilah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

iI Richard
I
'

i

'"

Hatfield

~ICKLES

and Margaret K.

~ickles,

Defendants and Appellants.

I 'lo. 19221
! FILED: Octob<r 7, 1986

'THIRD DISTRICT
Hon. Peter F. Leary
Hon. James Sawaya
1

1

A.TTORNEYS:
Curtis Nesset for Defendants and Appellants.
David L. Wilkinson, Dave B. Thompson for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
HOWE:, Jus1ice:

Defendants Richard Hatfield Nickles and
\1argaret K. N1cldes appeal 1heir convictions
of aggra1,ated ar~on and insurance fraud.
In the early morning hours of October 30,
1980, \1,h1le defendants and their 1wo daughters. Kimberly and Diane, were on a tnp to

Codc•Co
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California, an e,.;plosion and fire occurred at
their home in Salt Lake County An in.,estlg·
ation by the Salt Lake County Fire Department and Arson Task Force (ATf) uncovered
evidence of arson. Defendants were r,ubsequently charged with aggravated arr,on and
insurance fraud. both second degree felonie'i,
under U.C.A., 1953, §76-6-103 (1978) and
§76-6-521 ( 1978), respectively
n ey were
found guilty as charged. Mr. Nickles was
sentencecl lo 1 'o concurrent sent~nces of 011e
to fifteen ".'e;:iro:; in the Utah State Prison.
Mrs. Nicklf'.'i was given an identical sentence,
but the coun placed her on probation. Both
\\ere ordered 10 pay fines as well as restitution
I.

Defendants first contend that there was
insu[ricient evidence to suppon the verdict of
the jury. Our standard of review in this
regard is \\ell established; we review the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. S•are '" Dumas, 721 P 2d 502 !Utah
1986): State >. McCardell, 652 P 2d 942
!Utah 1982).
Cause of fire
Defendants maintain that reasonable doubt
exists. as a matter of \a\.\-, whether the explosi0n and fire were arson caused, and that
eHn if they were. whether defendants are the
guilt~ panics. To pre1,ail on this contention,
defendants must show that the evidence was
rn insubstanua! or Inclusive that reasonable
m1r.ds must ha\e entertained a reasonable
doubt that they commmed the crime charged.
Stare ' Dyer. 671 P 2d 142 !Utah 1983).
Section 76-6-103 (1978), in effect at the time
they were charged, provides that "!al person
1s guilty of aggra\ated arson if by 'Tleans of
fire or explosives he intentionally and unlawf ull:. damages
a habitable structure." The
record reflects the evidence of an arsoncaused explosion and fire.
Jn June of 19~0. several months before the
fire, the fire marsha!l and captain of the
Murray City Fire Department was asked by
Mr. Nickles :o \'I Sit Com poster Corporation.
a business operated by defendants. Mr.
'.'J1ckles e'>pre">sed his concern that the operator~ of :m adpcent boa! manufacturing business, .vho were experiencing financ1ai problems. might attempt to burn down their building. In response to his question about what
producl'i ~he bClat manufacturers might have
in their posse~>ion to set fire~. the fire mars'iall told '.'Jick.les that !!quid acetone could be
used. Although he made at least five subsequent '- 1sits to f\lr. Nickles at Com poster
Ccrporation during July and August, he
reqified that he had not seen signs of an

21

ongoing business at Com poster on any visit
Several weeks later, on August 13, 1980.
Composter Corporation borrowed $75,000
from Capital Thnft & Loan The note wa,
signed by defendants rndiv1dually and hy Mr
Nickles as president of the corporation. Their
home was mortgaged as 'ecurity for the loan,
and according to defendants, the loan was to
be paid out of the proceeds from its e.xpected
sale.
Defendants' home had been on the market
at variom times during 1980. and at the time
af the fire "Aas listed wtth one Ahce BlaJT, a
real estate agent. who had listed the home on
October l, 1980, for $239.000. She tes11ried
that she had not shown 1he home nor did she
have any potential buyers. and that defendants had refused to give her a key, c!a1mmg
that a complex burglar alarm system had
been mstalled. Blair had also been unable 10
schedule an open house, even on a weekend
defendants_ were going to be out of town,
1
despite her repeated efforts w do so
Defendants' home was ~overed by a "cad1llac" insurance policy which was increased
from $165,000 to $250,000 in January of
1980. This increase, made at their request,
was to cover the refurbishing of their home.
In early October of 1980, Mrs. Nickles
secured a ''rider" for silverware in the
amount of $17,280 which became effective on
October JO, 1980. Before the date of the fire
on October 30th, Mrs. Nickles, her daughters
and the family's two dogs left for California
Mr. Nickles planned to tly to Los Angeles for
business meetings and then JOJO his family 1n
Santa Maria.
On the evening of October 28, Mr Nickle'
telephoned a neighbor, Linda Dickert, and
told her that he had a casserole he wanted to
give her because he was leaving town al noon
the next day. Dicken's founeen-year-old
son, David, went over to pick up the casserole and found it sitting outside on a noYl"er
box. He did not go inside the house. He
noticed that one of defendants' cars was
backed up in the driveway with the trunk
opened, approximately ten feet from the
door. Several days earlier, Mrs. Nickles had
asked David to care for their cat while thev
were away. She had on previous occasions
given the Dickerts the key to the house; thi~
time, however, she placed the cat's food and
bov.. Is on the porch outside the front door
As Dickert ..,..as getting ready to go to bed.
about 3:00 a.m. on October 29th, she noticed
that lights v.cre on in nearly every room ol
defendants' house. She did not notice anv
movement or acuvuy. At the trial. she te'it1
fied that she had heard defendants talk about
acetone in connecuon with their business.
that she had 'ieen a gallon container of
acetone m their home, and that Mrs. Nickk~
had offered to lend. her some acetone, ,:la1-

f')r cumulative UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, see the i«ond stttlon of this ls.sue.

43

22
:ning, 1hat ">he had
~Ir

N1i.:k\c<;

it

UT AH ADVANCE REPORTS

b) the barrelfu!

1.,.a.,,

m

Cahforn1a

I
mforJ

\~Ith

his

1arn11} at the time he rece1\'ed a ca!I
rning hnn 1)1 :he explo'>lon and fire. They
1

el urned to Sah Lake City on November 2,

three d<J\"> later. In an intervie\"'
J~O"nt tnr /\ TF Jnd the Salt

with a ':>pec1al
Lake County

·\r<.nn fire Enlorcement Unit, Mr.
'.J1Lkle'> ;,t:ited that he had left for California

'-ir~cL1JI

11n

\\.'cdne~daJ, Octoher 29, at 11:50 a.m. He
nrl1ca1ed tha! on!" 1 w0 !ami\ies l<ne\~ cf his
tr ,1\ 'i rlans and r..,cit no one hJd heen gne'1 a

1,, the house. He al<;o stated that cer!ain

~,·1

il·1:il'les h.:id heen removed from the house

Inasmuch as the jury beliCved that the fire
had been arson caused, it 1s reasonable that it
would also find from that same evidence that
defend~nts committed the arson. Although
the evidence connecting defendants to the
crime 1.<; primarily circumstantial, it is a well~
settled rule that circumstantial evidence alone
may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accusr-d. Stale \/, Clayton, 646 P.2d 723

!Utah 1982); State v. Franks. 649 P.2d 3
(Utah 1982); State > Paradis, 106 Idaho 117,
676 P'.2d JI, cert denied, 104 Suµ. Ct. 3592
{1983); People v Pierce, 155 Cal. Rptr. 657,
595 P.2d 91 (19791; State v. Brady, 2 Anz.
App. 210, 407 P.2J 399 (19651 Circumstan-

·~l'ncern<.. JCout a pos"Jble hurglary.
1
-:c~t1ficatc<,
;iud rcrson.11 narcn had
llal evidence n ~d not be regarded as inferior
!:"C'e!l remO' ~'J rr'Jm lhe hou)e V,Hdt :rnd
evidence if it is of such quality and quantity
\tcrl1ng \!her had been placed in the \ault for
as to Justify a Jury in determining guilt
\J!ekeep1ng
During t!1at interview, Mr
be)ond e reasonable doubt, and 11i sufficient
Nickles inquired ;is to \\hether a timing
to sustain a conviction. State v. Weaver, 637
de\1ce had been found. Fire investigators
P.2d 23 (Mont. 1981).
\C'<;lified thJt :he} r.ad ob<;er\ed evidence of a
The jury couU'.1 reasonably infer the folio·
fla1nrnatile liquid explosion. multiple points
wing facts from the circumstantial evidence
,11 lire l'fl)'.:.in. "pour patterns.~ and 'puddle·
presented at trial: the defendants were in
ucJ'> 1nd1cat1H of fire origin. A de ... 1ce cons- serious financial trouble and made plans to
1\11n(I of
J hghl bulb embedded in a large
burn down their house to solve their
amount of new:paper ash with an electrical
problem; that they increased the insurance on
'.o.ne running from the b;:ise of the light bult 1 their house so the) would receive more
~ocket to 1n electrical outlet in the wall ·""·a<; j money from the policy; that Mrs. Nickels
found on the tloor if defendants' daughter, , refused to give the realtor a key because she
K1mherl\ ':; ba5cment bedroom. Also found \ v.anted to assist Mr. Nickles in setting the
1
1\cre 1r.,ilcro;
leaCrng out of her bedroom
house up for rhe fire; that she had lied about
1n1n rr · hal!wa\ The \\indcw.. and itc; frame the burglar alarm system because she planned
!O
claim 1l on the proof-of.loss sraLement;
111
i\1rnbe1 I~"' bedroom "'ere blown out.
ln\e<;t1g;Hor<:. found .:.even.I acetone soaked that Mr. Nickles put the casserole outside
'lll!i.:ao;e~ 11nder the qa1r"ay 1n the basement.
because he did not want the neighbor's son m
Expert tc<;!Hno11~ :lt trial d1scloc;ed that the his house to observe the fire preparations:
pour ranerm in ~he houst:. coupled with the that Mrs. Nickles put the cat's food out on
melted steel on J ::>u, Joor, indicated that the porch and did not give the neighbor's son
the key because she did not want the cat to be
~larnrnal>le l1qu1d had been poured on the
f\u(1r uf 'he hn11<;e before the fire. E'(perts inside when the fire sta'.rted; that she took the
,11<.ll te,;i1ieJ tt1at C"ploo;1on was not consis- family dogs with her to California for the
same reason; that the lights were on at 3:00
'L'll!
111!· :1 11.11ural ga'> e'p!osion, and was
a.rn. because Mr. Nickles was setting the fire;
not 11\..eh cau<l'd h~ swamp g;:is. Finally,
and finally, that defendants took their time
:xre~l~ •eq1f1cd that a '";\et-t:rpe'' exp!o~1on
returning from California because they were
.t~"-OC1atcrl w11~ llJ.rr.m;ibk !1quids produced
not shocked or surprised by news of the fire.
llVi\Jnt lire. Jnd 1de11t1f1ed che device found
If the jury concluded that each defendant,
.1, one ,·0mmonly u'ed b) arsonists to ignite
either directlv committed the defense or aided
Ille\
in its commi-ssion, the verdict must be sustaThe nrloq0r hmled f'!ass onto roofs and
ined. The jury had before it considerable
11~10 ·••:nds (1f 11earby hou<;es. \Vindo,,s "'ere
lil(lll'l ·•t1! 1n .1 r1t:1ghi>or'c; hou-;e, and the
circumstantial evidence from which it could
[ 1' l\ I ,,~
have concluded that defendants committed
)l~u!h
uf detendants' ''as
arson, either directly in the case of Mr.
'lni:!cd ~' 11,ime'>
Firemen arrived \\llhin
Nickles, or indirectly by aiding and assisting,
r11nu1e\ nt hc1ng \umrn0ned 10 fight the fire.
in the case of Mrs. Nickles.
'.~ l1 cn •lin :i.1r1\ed the h0me 1\t.1S engulfed in
11.\111(, rhe tne ~\;l< \ef\ ho! and difficult to

\.:e to

n·rt'.1

.J!~L'

Insurance Fraud

•''l111gu1\h

1 he

1.....,r!:'~l'!ll.-=

f.1..:ts

rre<.ented

o;ubstantial

,,, kn1..e ·1h1l·h ('<;tJblished. bevcnd a reason-

1hlc .Jnubt. that the fire hJd been caused b~
M~n'l

Guill of Defend:inh

Oefrndants also contend that there was
insufficient eYidence to support the jury's
\ erdict finding them guilty of insurance

fraud. On December JO, 1980, two months

after the fire, defendants submitted a proof-
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of-loss statement to their insurance carrier.

The

statement

listed

approximately

1700

items and claimed $233,35].29 for the house.
5134,000 for contents. $53,600 for loss of
use, $12,876 for 51\ver. $3,800 for furs,
$6,500 for landscape, and $360 for other
structures
Insurance adjusters assigned to the case

testified that numerous items of the greatest
value were not found in the remains of the
fire, and that, at best, only 500io of the items

claimed by defendants in their proof-of-loss
statement were located. lmesugators with the
Salt Lake Countv Attorney's Office were
unable to verify purchases of several major
i1ems, including the sterling silver purportedly
purchased at ZCMI, and other items allegedly
purchased by defendants and claimed in their
proof-of-loss statement.
Defendants assert that their submission of
an insurance claim which may have included
inaccurate estimates of value does not aJone
constitute fraud. We concede that it does not;
however, under UC.A., 1953, § 76-6-521.
we note that the jury, without addressing the
accuracy of the submitted estimates, could
easily find t!'lat defendants did commit insurance fraud Section 76-6-521 provides:
Every person who presents, or causes
to be presented, any false or fraudulent clairr., or any proof in support of
any such claim, upon any contract of
inrnrance for the payment of any
!ms, or ""ho prepares. makes or
subscribes any amount, certificate of
survey, affidant or proof of loss, or
other ~ook, paper or writing, with
intent ·o present or use the same, or
to allow lt to be presented or used, in
siJpporl )f any such cllirn is punishatile as in the manner prescribed for
theft of property of like value.
The plans submitted w the insurance
company for reconstruction of defendants'
house included, among other things, an inte·
rcom system and a burglar aJarm system,
neither of \lo'hich had been m the home prior
to the fire. [n fact, at lhe trial, Mrs. Nickles
testified tha~ the house did not hav:: a burglar
alarm system or an intercom system. From
the evidence presented at trial. it is clear that
defendants, despite the diff1cuH conditions
under which :hey were required to prepare
their proof-of-loss statement. presented a
false or fraudulent claim" to their insurance
:ompany Even 1f the Jury had chosen to
disbelieve the testimony of fire invesugators
as to items thev v. ere ur.able to !ocat~ or
ident1f) in :he ~ubble, the undisputed evidence that defendants claimed a nonexistent
burglar a.Jarm system and intercom system on
their proof-of-loss statement is suflicient
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gu1hy of insurance fraud. A determ1of whether their cla.Jm was excessive
on other items 1s unnecessarv inasmuch as the
defendants did submit a fraudulent claim
intentional!y misrepresenting the ex1qence of
these two items See Srate v. Kitchen, 564
P.2d 760, 763 (Utah 1977).

II.
Defendants next contend that evidence of a
telephone caJI received by an employet of
ATF approximately three weeks after the fire,
from a caller purporting to be Mr. Nickles,
was inadmissible because there was no authe·
ntication or identification of the caller. It is
well established that communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where otherv.1sc relevant to the facts and issue. 29 Am.
Jur. 2d Evidence §380 (and cases cued
therein). The 1dcnuty of a caJJer may be established by circumstanual evidence. Unaed
States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022 (1979):
Grogan v. Uniceci Scates, 394 F 2d 287 ilth
Cir 19"67); Srace v. Peele, 54 N.C. App. 247,
282 S.E.2d 578 (1981). Further. 1f the party
calling, in addition to a statement of his
identity. relates facts and circumstances
which, taken with other established facts,
tends to reveaJ his idenmy. the conversation
IS admtSsible. Scace v. Marlee, 94 Idaho 803,
498 P.2d 1276 (1972); 29 Am. Jur. 2d EVJdence § 384. Herc, both requirements were
satisfied At the tnaJ, the following testimony
was given by Ela.me Rice, a secretary for
ATF:

Q: At the time that you received the

call from the person calling, dtd the
person calling identify himself?
A: He identified himself to be himself
a Dick Nickles, yes.
Q: Yes.

Q· Did the person purporting

to be
Mr. Nickles have any further conversation with you?
A: Yes.

Q: If you would, to the best of your

recollect1on, descnbe or state what
the person purport mg to be Mr.
Nickles or Mr. Dick Nickles stated to
~ou dunng the course of the conversation.
A: He was asking about some arncles
thar had been removed from his home
and then mentioned to me that there
had been a suspected arson at his
home and that he had been suspec·

for cumulatht UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, wt lhr second SKlJon of 1hiJ iHut.

!led} of it and commented that wasn't
It lucky he had been 800 miles a"ay
v.1th the Secretary of the Department
of Energy and that he -would have
needed a very long fuse or a time
delay
Then, ~e again came back to the
f <Jct that rhese articles 1\ere missing
and r asked what Y..as missing and he '
said some sil.,.erware and 01her things,
whole drawers full. And I told him I
didn't belie\e we had them and that
he <;a1d po\sibly they had been
remo\ed f0:- safekeeping.
l !o!d him that I d1dn·t think we
had 1hcm. but that I 111ould have [the
1n\est1gacorj call v.hen he got back to
rhe tJffice
Jf

v.e ~'amine Lh1s :omersation in light of

1he rrmc1ples stated abo•e. 1t 1s clear thar the

·.~s11monv of Eileen Rice reveals that the
.:a!ler 1denufied himself as Mr. !'lickles.
rurther. he offered 1n!ormat1on to the empl("1\CC that onlv he or ~cmeone in his family
1\ould ha.,.e known. Although certain informatH"l11 rer1a1ning to the fire had been made
rubhc b~ 1he media. there is nothrng in the
record to contrO\ er' 1he logical inferences to
lie d1a .... n from this 1nform:Hton. i.e., that the
cJller w1s in fact .\t1r ~ickles. Defendants
·elv nn Srate ~ ,\far/a, supra, 10 support
·h~ir co.Hent1on that the lO\\er court should
not h:t\-:" admitted the '.elephone call into
~,,.1dence \\'e rind their reliance to be m1splJ~t:d Although the court m that case determined that a mere statement of his identity
h..,. the caller is insufficient proof of the caller·5 :d::nr1t\. · 1t also acknowledged that
1..c)rrohorar,,-n of a s1atement of tdenuty by
:he <:aller ~ufficten1 !O render the comersauon
Jdmirnble .lga1mc him may be supplied by
n 1dence
that the sub;cct matter of the call
re' e~kd rhat onh· the named party would
l1Hh have k;iov.ledge of those conversational
fJcrs. N
::>f other confirming circumstances
11h1..:h make 11 prol1able that the named
oero;;on '.\a~. in ract. the <;peakcr · Id. at 1281
l(1ta11ons omitted; emphJs1s added).
In St.ire • ,'-{am1Jton. 18S i\1ont. 522, 605
P 2d J !21 1 !9801 . .;at. Jenu:d . .J.J7 U.S. 924,
'.he \foncana Supreme Court no:ed:

The c0mple:eness of the identificarion
'..'c'eo;; to the 1\etght of the evidence
;,l!hcr rh;::rn co its admissibility, and
<he resron~1b!l1ty lies in che firsr instJnce 1\11h ;he Drstricf Court to deter.111ne v.1th1n !t< c;ound discreiion
1\hether the !hre<;hold of adm1rnbility
ha<; n:ot:"n met
IJ Jt 1 l.::'.S (citation 01 rntted). We find no
dt°'u~e o1 discretinn here, and find that the
!'.'1\er (OUT' rrorerlv Jdmit!'!d testimony of

the phorie call imo evidence.

Ill.
Defendants' third contention is that they
were denied their right to a fair trial due to
the individual and cumulative effect of evid·
ence which they claim was inadmissible
because it was irrelevant or immaterial. Rule

40 I. ' lTtah R. Evid., defines •relevant evid-

ence" as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of
consequerice to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." At the trial.
defense counsel objected. among other
things, to the admission of the neighbor's
testimony concerning the lights being on in
defendants' home in the early morning hours
of October 29, as well as evidence pertaining
to other accellerants, the amount of insurance
coverage on the property, and the proximity
of defendants' business to a thrift store.
We cannot find that the lower court abused
its discretion by admiuing this evidence. Even
if some of these admissions had been error,
in light of the other evidence presented at
trial, it would be harmless error in that there
1s no reasonable likelihood in the absence of
this evidence there would have been a diffe·
rent result in defendants' trial. See State v.
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982).
IV.
Defendants next contend that the trial
courr failed to properly instruct the jury on
the elements of insurance fraud by refusing
to give their requested Instruction No. 14.
That Instruction included, as an element to be
proved for conviction of the crime of insurance fraud, that the jury must find that defe.
ndants submitted values for items on their
proof-of-loss statement which were intentiO·
nally excessive, not just merely inaccurate.
estimates of value. They claim that this deficiency may have confused the jury to the
extent that it reached a guilty verdict without
sufficient evidence of criminal conduct. We
find this contention to be without merit. The
court's Instruction No. 21 adequately differ·
entiates between intentional fraud and reaso·
nable error in the submissions of estimates of
value. That instruction reads:
You are instructed that an act comm·
itted or an omission made under
ignorance or a mistake of fact which
disproves any criminal intent is not a
crime. Thus a person is not guilty of a
crime if he acts under an honest and
reasonable belief in the existence of
certain facts and circumstances
which, if true, would make such an
act or an omission lawful. If you find

that rh~ defendants, or either one,
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because of a reasonable mistake,
made certam claims upon an insurance company be/Jeving such claims
to be uue to the best of h1s knowledge, then you must find him not
gu1/ty of insurance fraud
(Emphasis added.) As we noted above, defe-

ndants' intention to submu a fraudulent
claim 1s clear from the undisputed evidence
that they claimed a nonexistent burglar alarm
svstem and intercom system. Thus, the court
Properly instructed the jury on the elements
of insurance fraud.

v.
Defendants' final contention 1s that they
are entitled to a new triaJ because there was a
conllict of interest on the part of the deputy
county anorney assigned to prosecute this
case. Earlier, we remanded this case to the
trial court for supplemental proceedings on
the issue of prosecutorial misconduct. Defendants moved the court for a new trial based
on the evidence presented at that heanng
The trial court denied their motion, finding
among other things, that ~the case was tried
and convictionlsl obtained upon evidence and
facts developed and found upon investigation
of the Salt Lake County Fire Department and
not AF!."
The prosecutor had been employed by the
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office since
!9.. 6. In 1979. he began prosecuting arson
and insurance fraud cases. and received trai'"'·:ng in arson and insurance fraud investigation from the National Fire Academy. In
June or July of 1980. the Salt Lake County
Auorney's Office was a recipient of a federal
grant co establish a countywide arson task
~orce, and he became the lead prosecutor for
that group (A Tf) The full task force investigated the fire at defendants' home. He, along
with other task force personnel, reviewed this
case for possible cnmmal charges.
The fire at defendants' home occurred
October 30, 1980. In late March of 198 I,
approximately five months later, the prosecuror along .,, uh his wife and one other individual formed a private corporation called
Arson and Fraud Investigation (AFI) which
was designed to provide JObs in arson investigation for •he several employeoes of the
County Attorne) 's Arson Task Force who
had been nottf1ed that their posiuons would
terminate as of Jul) I, 1981. AF! performed
eight investigations in Idaho, Wyoming, and
L'tah, and he personally participated in many
of thee'! 1mest11zations. He did nol advise the
Salt LJke C.Ju;ry Attorney about lhe incorporation of AF! In June of 1981, when the
Salt Lake Cc1 un!y ,"-.ttorney became aware of
ltS e.1(istencc, he asked the prosecutor to disassociate himself from the business. AF!

RE~P~O~R~T~S_ _ _ _ _ _~25

terminated its business operat1om by Septe·
I mber
of 1981 and filed Articles of Dt<:.~oiu
on December 8, 1982. Thus, the prosec.
I tion
utor had been uninvolved in the operation~ of
1

AFI for approximately one year by the time
defendants "'ere. brought to trial in June ol
1982.
U.C.A., 1953, §67-16-4(4). provides that
~no public officer or public employee shall
[ajccept other employment which he might
expect would impair his independence ot
judgment in the performance of his public
duties." A public prosecutor who 1s involved
with a corporation that mvesllgates poss1bk
arson and insurance fraud C3.5es for insurance
companies should not aJso be represenung the
state in the prosecution of s1m1lar cases. This
would appear to be a conflict of interest. The
pivotal issue here, however, becomes whether
in this instance, defendants were entitled to a
new tnal because of an apparent conflict of
interest.
The State cites Wnght v Unued States,
732 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1984), where the
Court of Appeals advocated a scaled approach to the review of prosccutonal conll!ct ot
interest claims. Specifically, 1t stated that:
[T]he degree of prosecutonaJ misconduct ... and the degree of prejudice to
the defendant necessary to jusufy
acuon by a reviewing court steadily
increase as the case goes forward,
with the least bemg requ1red on a
motion to disqualify, somewhat more
on a pretrial mouon· to dismiss an
indictment, still more on a motion in
the district court after conviction but
before appeal, [andj somewhat more
on a direct appeal ....

Id. at !056 n. 8.
It is clear that a prosecutor should be d1sq·

ualified on a timely motion when he has a
personal conflicting· interest in a case. Here,
however, defendants faded to move in !he
triaJ court to disqualify the prosecutor and
only now, on appeaJ, assen a denial of due
process and equal protection. Jn these circumstances. we must requue that defendants
prove actual prejudice. United States ¥.
Heldt, 668 F 2d 1238, 1277 (0.C. Cir. 1981),
cen denied. 456 U.S. 926 (1982). Defendants
have made no showmg of actual pre1udicc
To the extent that defendants might receive
relief from the prosecution solely on "
showing of potential preJud1ce, they would
become the undeservmg beneficiaries of a
rule that attempts to promote the pub!K
good. As we noted above, the business of
AFI terminaled its operauons in Septembrr
of 1981; defendants were not brought to trial
unul June of 1982. Any confl1c1 the prosecutor had between AFI and defenC:ants' case
had been severed long prior to the trial. All
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work performed by him on lhis case from the
urne ol t 11e fire in October of 1980 until June
of 1981, when he jiscontmued his association
with AFI, was performed in his capacity as
Deputy Ccur1ty Attorney. AFI played no part
in
the in·. . est1gation
Defendants correctly
note that the same prosecutor's misconduct

caused reversal of an earlier arson conviction
by this Court

in

Scace v. Troy, 688 P 2d 483

{Utah 1984). Howe\'er, the facts requiring
reversal in that case, i.e., the ina~propriate

comments made by the prose:::utor during

opening and closing statements, are not anal·
ogous to the conflict of interest issue presented here. Absent a showing of actual preju·
dice which the defendants were unable to
make, we find no error ""hich would justify a

new trial, and the lower
denied their morion.
Convictions affirmed.

court

properly

WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall. Chief Justice
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice

1.
This Rule is comparable in substance to
former Rule 1(2). Utah R. hid. (1971); the

former Rule. in effect at the trial in this
action, defines "relevant evidence~ as that
having a tendency to prove or disprove the
ex.istence of any ,, material fact." The
applicanon of former Rule I (2) by this Court
in Scace ,,
Peterson. 560 P 2d 1387 (Utah
t 977), is harmonious with the new language.

